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§1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the creation of pragmatism, a great deal of ink has been spilt attempting to 
determine who is or is not a ‘real’ pragmatist, and what exactly that might mean. In 
recent scholarship, the division most commonly drawn is between the respective 
pragmatisms of Charles S. Peirce and William James. Peirce is seen as providing an 
account of pragmatism which is logically grounded, scientific in approach, and which 
offers an objective account of truth. As such, his pragmatism coheres with prevalent 
attitudes and projects in Anglo-American philosophy. James’s pragmatism, on the 
other hand, is presented as the kind which was rightly rejected by the founding 
analytic philosophers. It is woolly, nominalistic, and deeply subjectivist. Whether 
intentionally or not, the argument goes, this version of pragmatism opens a door 
which leads to relativism and ‘vulgar Rortyism’.1 
It is not only contemporary scholars who make this division, however. The first person 
to separate Jamesian and Peircean pragmatisms was in fact Peirce himself. In his 1905 
                                                 
1 Haack (1997). For examples of the division between these two types of pragmatism in recent 
scholarship, see in particular Misak (2013), and also Talisse (2010; 2013); Talisse and Aikin (2005); Haack 
(1977; 1997) and Mounce (1997) for a book length account of the split. Rorty makes the same split in the 
opposite direction, endorsing Jamesian pragmatism and arguing that Peirce did little more than give 
pragmatism its name (1982: 161). Klein (2013) and Levine (2013) are two contemporary figures arguing 
against this asserted divide from a Jamesian position. 
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Monist article, entitled ‘What Pragmatism Is’, Peirce distinguishes between 
‘pragmatism’, a broad church which includes himself, James, Dewey, Schiller, as well 
as many historical figures, and ‘pragmaticism’, which was a more narrow and defined 
version of pragmatism to which he subscribed. Though surprisingly coy in the 
published article about who precisely he was trying to distance himself from (he was, 
after all, still to some extent reliant on James's fame and good will), elsewhere it is 
clear that his target was James and those who followed him. Peirce held that James 
applied the doctrine of pragmatism too liberally, and that his ‘remodelling’ of 
pragmatism had prominent parts which he held to be ‘opposed to sound logic’. (1908, 
CP6.482; cf. 1903, CP5.358n.1).2 It was this which drove him to ‘kiss goodbye’ to his 
‘child’ pragmatism, and give birth to ‘pragmaticism’, a name which he held to be ‘ugly 
enough to be safe from kidnappers’ (1905, CP5.414). 
Despite this ugliness, it is precisely the aim of this paper to kidnap this term 
‘pragmaticism’, and argue that it should be applied to James as well as to Peirce. The 
next section will move through the various criteria by which Peirce separates his own 
‘pragmaticism’ from pragmatism more broadly, focusing on his two Monist articles, 
both published in 1905, ‘What Pragmatism Is’ and ‘Issues of Pragmaticism’ (§2). The 
subsequent sections will show that James meets these various criteria, looking in 
particular at James's position on metaphysical inquiry (§3), his stance on critical 
common-sensism (§4), and his realism about generals (§5). Though James himself was 
unconcerned to discern differences between various versions of pragmatism, 
preferring to focus on commonalities, by calling him a pragmaticist I hope to bridge 
the apparent divide between the two thinkers, and bring them into a more productive 
dialogue.  
 
§2. PRAGMATISM AND PRAGMATICISM 
 
At the beginning of the first Monist article, Peirce gives us the terminological rule by 
which he separates ‘pragmatism’ from ‘pragmaticism’: 
the name of a doctrine would naturally end in -ism, while -icism might 
mark a more strictly defined acception of that doctrine (1905, CP5.413). 
                                                 
2 For abbreviations see bibliography. 
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Pragmaticism, then, is meant to be a more defined version of pragmatism. In a letter to 
the Italian pragmatist Mario Calderoni, Peirce presents the position he adopted in this 
article in the following way: 
I proposed that the word ‘pragmatism’ should hereafter be used 
somewhat loosely to signify affiliation with Schiller, James, Dewey, 
Royce, and the rest of us, while the particular doctrine which I invented 
the word to denote, which is your first kind of pragmatism, should be 
called ‘pragmaticism.’ The extra syllable will indicate the narrower 
meaning (1905, CP8.205). 
Peirce considers his ‘original’ conception of what he now calls pragmaticism to have 
a number of advantages over the pragmatisms which followed it, and sees it as 
immune to a number of the problems which less precise pragmatisms entail (1905, 
CP5.415).3 Pragmaticism, then, is the original, best, and most strictly defined version 
of pragmatism. 
Seeing as pragmaticism is a more refined example of pragmatism, we need to be clear 
on what Peirce means by ‘pragmatism’. Pragmatism, according to Peirce, emerges out 
of the application of a certain kind of scientific methodology to philosophy. When 
someone with an ‘experimentalist’ perspective is asked to assess the meaning of any 
assertion, they tend to do so in terms of the kinds of experiences we should expect if 
certain actions are performed (1905, CP5.411). It was this experimentalist perspective 
which lead Peirce to express the pragmatic maxim, which in 1905 he defines in the 
following way: 
if one can define accurately all the conceivable experimental phenomena 
which the affirmation or denial of a concept could imply, one will have 
therein a complete definition of the concept, and there is absolutely 
nothing more in it (1905, CP5.412).4 
                                                 
3 Peirce thinks that the ‘capital merit’ of his pragmaticism over other pragmatisms is that it ‘more readily 
connects itself with a critical proof of its truth’ (1905, CP5.415). See Hookway (2012: 197-234) for an 
examination of Peirce's attempts to ‘prove’ pragmaticism. 
4 Peirce's original expression of the pragmatic maxim was in ‘How to Make Our Ideas Clear’ (1878, 
W3:266). Other, distinct expressions of the pragmatic maxim can be found throughout Peirce's work 
(cf. 1903, CP5.18; 1905, CP5.9; 1905, CP5.438). See Hookway (2012: 165-181) for an exploration of these 
different formulations.  
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A ‘pragmatist’ in Peirce's terms is simply someone who holds some version of the 
pragmatic maxim. He is happy to attribute this definition to himself, James, Dewey, 
Schiller, Royce, and others (1905, CP5.414; 1905, CP8.205). 
Before giving an account of ‘pragmaticism’ and its differences from pragmatism, 
Peirce is keen to assert that there are several ‘preliminary propositions’ which we must 
adopt if our pragmaticism is going to be anything more than ‘a nullity’. He thinks that 
some of the other pragmatists (he mentions Schiller) include some of these 
propositions within their pragmatism, but Peirce aims here to present them precisely 
(1905, CP5.416). These propositions include a commitment to anti-foundationalism, 
anti-scepticism, and a theory of beliefs as habits of action. Let's take these in turn. 
Peirce consistently and explicitly rejects any philosophical methodologies which 
attempt to find some certain foundation for philosophical reflections, either through 
the ‘first impressions of sense’, or by ‘doubting everything’ until we find something 
indubitable. The first strategy forgets that all our perceptions ‘are the results of 
cognitive elaboration’. The second misunderstands what ‘doubt’ really is (1905, 
CP5.416). 
True doubt, Peirce tells us elsewhere, is an unpleasant state of mind which is 
characterised by a feeling of unease and by an inability to continue with some actual 
conduct. It is defined by the interruption of some actual belief, and initiates an inquiry 
to regain a stable belief (cf. 1877, W4:247-8; 1905, CP5.510). Peirce often contrasts true 
doubt with what he calls ‘paper-doubt’ (e.g. 1906, CP6.498). These are doubts merely 
entertained in philosophical reflection, ‘as if doubting were “as easy as lying”’. But 
doubting is not easy. We cannot really doubt anything which we actually live by, and 
that which we do not actually doubt, we must ‘regard as infallible, absolute truth’ 
(1905, CP5.416). Combined with his anti-foundationalism, then, Peirce presents a kind 
of anti-scepticism. 
Rather than looking for some indubitable foundation from which to start our 
philosophical inquiry, Peirce holds that: 
there is but one state of mind from which you can ‘set out’, namely the 
very state of mind in which you actually find yourself at the time you 
do ‘set out’ – a state in which you are laden with an immense mass of 
cognition already formed, of which you cannot divest yourself if you 
would (1905, CP5.416). 
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Asserting that beliefs which we do not actually doubt are held to be absolutely true 
does not commit Peirce to anti-fallibilism. Peirce’s assertion is that we must hold them 
to be absolutely true until we find an experience which actually leads us to really doubt 
them. Real doubt is ‘only called into being by a certain finite stimulus’ (1905, CP5.416). 
Any belief is theoretically open to doubt, but we should not doubt our beliefs until we 
have good reason to. Peirce likens his view of inquiry to walking on a bog, rather than 
walking on a bedrock of certain fact. The best we can say is ‘this ground seems to hold 
for the present. Here I will stay until it begins to give way’ (1898, CP5.589).  
This talk of real doubt leads us to our next preliminary proposition: that belief is a 
habit of action. A belief is not a ‘momentary mode of consciousness’ but is a ‘habit of 
mind essentially enduring for some time’. It is a disposition to a certain kind of 
conduct, in certain contexts. Doubt, on the other hand, is a ‘condition of erratic 
activity’. One of the things which we are incapable of doubting is that we can influence 
our own habits. We can only consider ourselves and others responsible for conduct 
that is capable of being altered. Through preparation in imagination, and reflection 
after our actions, we alter our habits of conduct. The ideal end point of such a process 
is conduct which is marked by ‘an entire absence of self-reproach’ (1905, CP5.417-8). 
So, Peirce's full position is that belief is a habit of action which is subject to self-control.5 
These are the preliminary propositions which any pragmaticism has to adopt. Peirce 
now goes on to describe pragmaticism itself. The first assertion he makes is that 
pragmaticism is a type of ‘prope-positivism’ (1905, CP5.423).6 This essentially means 
that pragmaticism is committed to the application of scientific methodology to the 
problems of philosophy. Peirce expressed such a position first in ‘The Fixation of 
Belief’, in which he argued that the method of science was superior to the method of 
a priori reasoning (1877, W3:242-57). It is through experiment and experience that we 
determine what is true, in any area of inquiry, and philosophy is no different. The 
application of the pragmatic maxim to philosophical problems allows us to determine 
which avenues of inquiry can reach experimentally testable conclusions, and which 
are ‘meaningless gibberish’. Subsequently, ‘what will remain of philosophy will be a 
series of problems capable of investigation by the observational methods of the true 
sciences’ (1905, CP5.423). 
                                                 
5 For more on Peirce on (moral) self-control, cf. (CP1.591ff). 
6 Peirce had previously defined the prefix ‘prope’ as marking a ‘broad and rather indefinite extension 
of the meaning of the term to which it was prefixed’ (1905, CP5.413). 
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Calling pragmaticism a prope-positivism does not commit Peirce to any kind of 
materialism, naturalism, or claims about the reducibility of metaphysical propositions 
to propositions of a particular natural science. This is purely a position about the kind 
of methodology we should see as operative in our philosophical inquiries. 
Pragmaticism is distinguished from other positivisms, according to Peirce, by its 
holding three other doctrines: 
[W]hat distinguishes it from other species [of positivism] is, first, its 
retention of a purified philosophy; secondly, its full acceptance of the 
main body of our instinctive beliefs; and thirdly, its strenuous insistence 
upon the truth of scholastic realism (1905, CP5.423). 
It is these three criteria which are doing the work in distinguishing pragmaticism, not 
just from other positivisms, but also from other kinds of pragmatism.  
The first criterion concerns Peirce's assertion that pragmaticism does not reject all 
metaphysics, but ‘extracts from it a precious essence, which will serve to give light 
and life to cosmology and physics’ (CP5.423). Peirce wants ‘pure’ philosophy, such as 
logic, metaphysics, and ethics, to still be pursuable under pragmaticism, just pursued 
according to the scientific method. The second criterion concerns what Peirce calls, in 
his second 1905 Monist paper, ‘critical common-sensism’, and which he connects with 
Scottish common-sense philosophy (1905, CP7.438-463). Elsewhere Peirce expresses 
this view by saying that pragmaticism ‘implies faith in common sense and in instinct, 
though only as they issue from the cupel-furnace of measured criticism’ (1908, 
CP5.480). The third criteria asserts the validity of scholastic realism. In Peircean terms, 
this means realism about ‘thirdness’. The pragmaticist must be a realist about 
generals, laws, continuity, possibility, and relation (cf. 1903, CP5.93ff).7 
This is not the place to rehearse Peirce's arguments for, and defences of, these various 
positions. The aim of this paper is to determine whether on these criteria Peirce could 
legitimately separate his own pragmatism from that of James. According to his 
published papers of 1905, Peirce has given us six criteria by which we can recognise a 
pragmaticist: 1), they must hold some version of the pragmatist maxim; 2) they must 
be committed to the ‘preliminary propositions’ of anti-foundationalism, anti-
scepticism, and seeing belief as a habit of action susceptible to self-control; 3) they 
must be committed to scientific methodology in philosophical investigations; 4) they 
must be committed to the possibility of metaphysical inquiry; 5) they must be a critical 
                                                 
7 cf. (Peirce, 1903, CP5.93ff; c.1888, W6:172ff). 
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common-sensist, and; 6) they must be a realist about generals. The rest of the paper 
will aim to show that James does in fact meet these criteria. 
I will assume that it is fairly uncontentious that James meets criteria 1) and 3). James 
expressed his own and Peirce's version of the pragmatic maxim repeatedly (1898, P: 
257ff; 1907, P: 29-30). He also held that philosophical investigations such as moral, 
religious, and metaphysical inquiries should be performed in a way quite analogous 
to science (cf. 1891, WB: 157; 1896, WB: 8-9). Peirce agrees that he, James, and the other 
pragmatists agree on these two points (cf. c.1906, CP4.464-5). Both hold that a 
proposition's meaning is located in the future, and found by tracing what experiences 
would follow from it being true (cf. Peirce, 1905, CP5.427; James, 1907, P: 44ff). 
James also meets the second criterion. He consistently held a version of anti-
scepticism, on the grounds that we must reject it if we are to continue with our 
practices of philosophy, morality, and finding our lives meaningful (cf. 1891, WB: 141; 
1896, WB: 20; 28; 1909, MT: 107-8). He also rejects foundationalism, on the ground that 
no belief is self-certifying. Though we can become more certain of our beliefs as 
experience continues to confirm them, none of our beliefs can be shown to be so certain 
that they could not be revisable in the long run (1896, WB: 20-24). James linked 
pragmatism with the theory that beliefs were habits of action (1898, P: 259), and also 
held that these habits were subject to self-control (1890, PP1: 126ff; cf. 1892/1899, TT: 
47ff). These are all of Peirce's ‘preliminary propositions’. 
Operating on the fairly safe assumption that James accepts the first three criteria, I will 
spend the rest of the paper arguing that James meets the latter three.  
 
§3. JAMES AND METAPHYSICS (CRITERION 4) 
 
In his review of James's Principles of Psychology, Peirce criticises James for bracketing 
metaphysical questions out of his psychology (1890, CP8.60). James's move at the 
beginning of the Principles is to uncritically assume the propositions required for the 
science of psychology to proceed: that there are minds with thoughts and feelings, that 
there is a physical world, and that minds can know that world. All these assumptions 
can be called into question, but, according to James, ‘the discussion of them [...] is 
called metaphysics and falls outside the province of this book’ (1890, PP1: 6). James 
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restricts his psychology to the investigation of what he takes to be the empirical 
phenomena of feelings, thoughts, brain states, and their relations. Explanations of 
these phenomena which appealed to entities such as ‘souls’ or ‘transcendental egos’ 
would be, again, metaphysical. So, James aims to separate psychology as a natural 
science from metaphysics. 
James’s position in the Principles might be taken as an example of him rejecting the 
possibility of usefully and scientifically inquiring into metaphysical propositions. 
However, it is not at all clear that James is denying that certain metaphysical 
considerations have a bearing on psychology, or that these considerations can be 
inquired into. Indeed, he suggests that his adopted assumptions, which appear to be 
metaphysical in nature, can be discussed in a separate metaphysical inquiry. This 
presumably means that such an inquiry could disprove, alter, or criticise these 
assumptions in a way that would effect empirical psychology. James just does not 
think that such an inquiry should be performed within empirical psychology. His aim 
appears to be the delineation of different avenues of inquiry, with the understanding 
that that they can influence each other when appropriate. 
In actual fact, James is quite clear from a very early point in his career that metaphysics 
is a necessary type of inquiry. For instance, in his 1879 version of ‘The Sentiment of 
Rationality’, James says the following: 
Metaphysics of some sort there must be. The only alternative is between 
the good Metaphysics of clear-headed Philosophy, and the trashy 
Metaphysics of vulgar Positivism (1879, EPh: 56-57). 
James makes at least two points about the necessity of pursuing metaphysical inquiry. 
The first concerns the idea that any account of the world will involve some 
metaphysics. Even apparently metaphysically innocent statements about ‘Nature’ and 
‘Law’ involve taking an implicit ontological stance. We can either accept the 
unexamined materialist metaphysics of ‘vulgar positivism’ without question, or we 
undertake some more careful philosophical investigation into metaphysics.  
James's second point about metaphysics concerns the necessity of metaphysical 
inquiry for practical life. Each of us carries around some metaphysical formula, some 
picture of the way we think the universe is, ‘under [our] hat’ (1879, EPh: 32). In most 
cases these metaphysical ideas are confused and unexamined. They tell us what we 
ought to expect from the world, what possibilities the universe allows for, and what 
meanings our actions can or cannot have within it. These metaphysical systems have 
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real practical effects on our lives, and can lead to real practical and existential 
problems when they go wrong (cf. 1896, WB: 39-40). It is in some sense the 
philosopher’s task to make explicit, organise, and improve these various inchoate 
metaphysical positions.  
James's primary use of the pragmatic maxim, in later years, was its application to 
metaphysical and other philosophical problems in an attempt to elucidate the 
pragmatic issues which were at stake. In some cases, this would lead to the discovery 
that there were no pragmatic or experiential effects, and so a dissolution of the 
problem. In other cases, the application of the maxim would discover the practical 
difference between the competing options so that they could be frankly evaluated and 
tested on their pragmatic effects (e.g., 1907, P: 45ff). In this regard, James seems to be 
following Peirce's suggestion that the application of the pragmatic maxim to 
philosophy would separate problems which can be solved through the experimental 
method, and those which were ‘meaningless gibberish’ (1905, CP5.423).  
Overall, James seems to be committed to the view that we should reject ‘vulgar 
positivism’, and its distaste for metaphysics, and consider a scientifically conducted 
metaphysical inquiry a necessary part of philosophy. 
 
§4. JAMES AND CRITICAL COMMON-SENSISM (CRITERION 5) 
 
It is in his second Monist article on this topic, entitled ‘Issues of Pragmaticism’, that 
Peirce clarifies exactly what he means by ‘Critical Common-Sensism’. Critical 
common-sensism is a variety of Scottish common-sense philosophy, but differentiated 
by six different characteristics. I'll briefly run through these characteristics now. 
Any common-sensism involves the assertion that there are foundational beliefs which 
are indubitable. For Peirce, this means indubitable in the sense that they are not 
currently susceptible to real doubt. The first characteristic of critical common-sensism 
is that there are inferences as well as beliefs which are indubitable in this sense. The 
second is that common sense beliefs evolve over generations as a result of human 
beings' interactions with their environment. The third character is that we should 
think of these beliefs as instincts which are indubitable when applied to contexts 
similar to those in which they evolved. The further from their appropriate contexts, 
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the more vague these beliefs become, which is the fourth character of critical common-
sensism. Fifth, the critical common-sensist not only revises these beliefs in the light of 
appropriate experience, but also seeks out experiences which might lead them to doubt 
these beliefs, before asserting them to be indubitable. And sixth, critical common-
sensism is critical of itself, regular common-sensism, psychologism, and Kantianism 
(1905, CP5.440-452). 
According to Peirce the ‘most distinctive’ character of the critical common-sensist is 
the fourth, that ‘the acritically indubitable is invariably vague’ (1905, CP5.446). Peirce's 
notion of vagueness is complex, but here it will be sufficient to connect vagueness with 
indeterminacy of application or interpretation. In an unpublished paper on the same 
topic, Peirce tells us that: 
[a] sign is objectively vague, insofar as, leaving its interpretation more or 
less indeterminate, it reserves for some other possible sign or experience 
the function of completing the determination (c.1905, CP5.505). 
It is with this in mind that we should interpret Peirce's claim that the principle of 
contradiction does not apply to vague propositions. A vague proposition is still open 
to being interpreted in a number of definite ways. Until we know which determinate 
form a vague proposition should take, ‘it may be true that a proposition is true and 
that a proposition is false’ (1905, CP5.448).8  
Perhaps the simplest way to think about critical common-sensism is that it is the thesis 
that there are indubitable (in the sense of not available to real doubt) beliefs and 
inferences which are fallible (in the sense that they can be revised if we encounter the 
right kinds of experience) and vague (in the sense that they require more definite 
articulation in contexts further away from their original context), which form a basic 
foundation for many of our practices. 
James deals with the idea of common sense in his Pragmatism lectures. There he 
presents the view that every individual is an ‘extreme conservative’ in the sense that 
everyone naturally wants to preserve their beliefs. When we are compelled by 
experience to adopt a new belief, we try to minimize the effect this new addition has 
on beliefs which we already hold. However, once a new belief has been adopted, it 
tends to alter those which it is inferentially related to. In this way ‘[o]ur minds [...] 
grow in spots; and like grease-spots, the spots spread’ (1907, P: 83). But the new beliefs 
                                                 
8 See Hookway (2000: 135-158) for a more detailed elaboration of the subject of vagueness in Peirce, and 
the usefulness of vague propositions. 
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we adopt are also altered by our older ones. Any novel experience is couched in the 
various assumptions and predictions of our old beliefs. In this sense James gives us a 
kind of ‘Neurath's boat’ image, not dissimilar to Peirce's bog metaphor: ‘[w]e patch 
and tinker more than we renew. The novelty soaks in; it stains the ancient mass; but it 
is also tinged by what absorbs it’ (1907, P: 83). 
The ‘ancient mass’ James is talking about here is our store of inherited beliefs, which 
James also terms common-sense. These are a class of beliefs which serve as the 
foundation of most of our everyday practices, and include in their number notions 
such as ‘a thing’, space and time, minds and bodies, and the difference between reality 
and fantasy. Though critical philosophy might be able to question these foundational 
elements of our thought, we cannot really doubt them in our practical lives. James 
takes the notion of a ‘thing’ as an example. We might postulate in philosophy that a 
thing is just a ‘group of sense-qualities united by a law’. Or we might in physical 
science learn that a thing is a swirling mass of atoms. Nonetheless, when ‘critical 
pressure is relaxed’, and we leave the classroom or laboratory, we return to our 
common-sense ideas of things. ‘Our later and more critical philosophies’, James tells 
us, ‘are mere fads and fancies compared with this natural mother-tongue of thought’. 
It is only ‘minds debauched by learning’ which even suspect common-sense beliefs of 
not being ‘absolutely true’ (1907, P: 85-89). 
Despite their foundational role, these ideas are neither permanent nor absolute. Like 
Peirce, James holds them to be the result of generations of evolution. All common-
sense beliefs were once hypotheses, adopted by our primitive ancestors, applied to 
experience, and found to work so successfully that they became a fundamental part 
of our thought. As James puts it, ‘our fundamental ways of thinking about things are 
discoveries of exceedingly remote ancestors, which have been able to preserve themselves 
throughout experience of all subsequent time’ (1907, P: 83).  The fundamentality of these 
beliefs makes them harder to question, and makes it less likely that we will encounter 
an experience which will make us doubt them. But we should not consider them 
infallible or self-evident, as the rationalistic scholastic philosophers did. No matter 
how old they are, we should still consider our common-sense beliefs to be ‘a collection 
of extraordinarily successful hypotheses’, and so subject to revision in appropriate 
circumstances. At least in philosophical inquiry, then, we should maintain a healthy 
‘suspicion’ about common-sense ideas, rather than assuming their eternal veracity 
(1907, P: 90-94).  
These common-sense beliefs are the foundation of most if not all of our everyday 
practices, and are instrumental in the sense that they allow us to make inferences and 
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predictions about future experience. However, the application of these common-sense 
beliefs outside of the contexts in which they emerged leads to them being less 
determinate, and the inferences we make using them less secure. For instance, our 
concepts of time and space work perfectly well when we apply them to our daily 
practical lives. But when we apply our common-sense ideas on a cosmic scale, they 
become ‘vague, confused, and mixed’. Accordingly, James tells us that ‘[t]he moment 
you pass beyond the practical use of these categories [...] to a merely curious or 
speculative way of thinking, you find it impossible to say within just what limits of 
fact any one of them shall apply’ (1907, P: 87-90). This is essentially Peirce’s point 
concerning the indeterminacy of common-sense beliefs when applied to different 
contexts. 
We have some reason, then, to think that James holds a common-sensism which is just 
as ‘critical’ as Peirce’s. Like Peirce, James holds that there are indubitable (in the sense 
of us having no real reason to doubt them) beliefs and inferences, which are fallible 
(in the sense that they can be revised if we encounter the right kinds of experience) 
and vague (in the sense that they require more definite articulation in contexts further 
away from their original context), and which form a basic foundation for many of our 
practices. 
 
§5. JAMES AND SCHOLASTIC REALISM (CRITERION 6) 
 
Of the criteria which defined pragmaticism, scholastic realism was the most important 
to Peirce. He called himself a realist of an ‘extreme stripe’ (c.1906, CP5.470), and 
suggested that ‘pragmaticism could hardly have entered a head that was not already 
convinced that there are real generals’ (1905, CP5.503). It is also the most important 
criterion for our current inquiry. It is James’s supposed nominalism which is most 
often alluded to when drawing a distinction between his and Peirce’s pragmatisms. 
Scholastic realism is deeply connected with Peirce’s category of ‘thirdness’. Being a 
realist about thirdness means being committed to realism about generals, laws, 
relations, possibility, and continuity. Rejecting realism about thirdness is what Peirce 
means by nominalism. Nominalism, according to Peirce, is a flawed doctrine, which 
has serious negative implications for both theoretical inquiry and practical life. 
Despite this, he saw it as being almost universally held among contemporary and 
IS WILLIAM JAMES A PRAGMATICIST? 
13 
 
historical thinkers. In a letter to James in 1904, Peirce described refuting nominalism 
as by far pragmatism's ‘most important consequence’ (1904, CP8.258). 
Peirce has a consistent definition of what it means for something to be ‘real’. The real 
is ‘that whose characters are independent of what anybody may think them to be’, and 
is the object which is represented by that ‘opinion which is fated to be ultimately 
agreed to by all who investigate’ (1878, W3:271-273). The difference between the 
scholastic realist and the nominalist, then, concerns whether or not laws, generals, and 
relations have this kind of reality. The realist will hold that they do, whereas the 
nominalist will hold that they are ‘constituted simply by […] the way in which our 
minds are affected by the individual objects which have in themselves no resemblance 
or relationship whatsoever’. Note that the scholastic realist need not hold that generals 
are independent of all thought, but only that they are independent of ‘how you, or I, 
or any number of men think’ and so are independent of ‘all that is arbitrary and 
individual in thought’ (1871, W2:467-9).9 
In this final section I aim to show that James is a realist about generals in this sense, 
and so meets Peirce’s final criterion for being recognised as a pragmaticist. I shall do 
so by arguing that James is not a nominalist in three separate areas: he is not an 
ontological nominalist (§5.1); he does not have a nominalist view of perception (§5.2); 
and he is not an epistemological nominalist (§5.3). 
 
§5.1 ONTOLOGICAL NOMINALISM 
 
The central ontological thesis of nominalism is that reality at bottom is solely made up 
of discrete individuals, and that laws, generals, and relations are not real. As Peirce 
puts it, nominalists ‘recognise but one mode of being, the being of an individual thing 
or fact’ (1903, CP1.21). 
James certainly takes individuals to be of central importance in his philosophy, and 
this is often taken to be evidence of his nominalism. At least part of the reason James 
prioritised individuals in this way was his antagonism towards a specific version of 
Absolute idealism. James argued (particularly in A Pluralistic Universe) that the 
monistic idealisms which exclusively privileged the general and the universal in their 
                                                 
9 Cf. (Peirce 1909, CP6.453) for a later expression of the same view. 
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accounts of reality produced not only intellectual but also existential problems. 
However, denying the priority of generals is not the same as denying their reality.10 
In fact, when criticising traditional empiricisms and idealisms in his metaphysical 
work, James suggests that they have a common problem at root. And that problem 
looks a lot like nominalism. Both start from the assumption that reality is 
fundamentally dis-unified. Once we start from an assumption of atomism, the patterns 
and the unities which we experience become mysterious. Empiricism attempts to 
solve this problem by appealing to conventional habits of association, and idealism by 
introducing trans-experiential agencies to bind the disparate elements of our 
experience together (e.g. ‘The Absolute’). Rather than starting from a false assumption 
of atomism, however, James points to the fact that our normal experience contains 
both continuities and discontinuities. We have no more reason, he argues, for 
assuming that one requires explanation any more than the other. If idealists and 
empiricists were consistent, they would feel compelled to produce philosophical 
explanations for the disunity as well as the unity found in our experience. James's 
strategy, on the other hand, is to assume that continuity and discontinuity are on an 
equal ontological footing: 
[I]f we insist on treating things as really separate when they are given as 
continuously joined, invoking, when union is required, transcendental 
principles to overcome the separateness we have assumed, then we 
ought to stand ready to perform the converse act. We ought to invoke 
higher principles of disunion, also, to make our merely experiential 
disjunctions more truly real. Failing this, we ought to let the originally 
given continuities stand on their own bottom (1904, ERE: 26-27). 
Without naming it, James is criticising classical empiricism and certain forms of 
idealism for assuming a nominalistic world picture. 
The main methodological postulate of James's ‘radical empiricism’ is that we should 
treat everything which is experienceable as real, and vice-versa (1904, ERE: 22). 
James's assertion that we should take continuity to be just as real as discontinuity 
should be understood in this full metaphysical sense. Of course, any actual instance 
                                                 
10 Peirce was certainly an ‘extreme’ realist, in that he held that generals were ‘the most important 
element of being’ (1898, CP4.1), and that even Duns Scotus was too nominalistic (c.1905, CP1.560). But, 
in his 1905 Monist articles, he does not claim that this extremity is required by the pragmaticist, only 
that realism is. 
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of experienced continuity might be shown to be false on subsequent examination. But 
there is no reason for rejecting the reality of all continuity.11 
Most often when James talks about continuity in his radical empiricism papers, he 
refers to relations which obtain between features of experience. The relations which he 
has in mind are both conjunctive and disjunctive, and include nextness, similarity and 
difference, tendency, causality, purpose, identity, and continuation (cf. ERE: 23-4). The 
relations are themselves capable of being experienced, and so are just as real as 
anything else under the radical empirical hypothesis. James compares his own view, 
in which these relations are real and objective, with rationalism and traditional 
empiricism: 
[Relations] are undeniable parts of pure experience; yet, while common 
sense and what I call radical empiricism stand for their being objective, 
both rationalism and the usual empiricism claim that they are 
exclusively the ‘work of the mind’ (1905, ERE: 74). 
Radical empiricism is the view that reality demonstrates an experiential unity through 
relations and continuities which are themselves experiential and objective (1905, ERE: 
53; 1909, MT: 7), and which are independent of any individual or set of minds (1904, 
ERE: 40). And by presenting this view James is not only rejecting monistic idealism, 
but also nominalism.12 
As well as his commitment to objective relations between objects, James holds that we 
can discern general empirical ‘laws of nature’, such as ‘heat melts ice’ and ‘salt 
preserves meat’. These are the kinds of empirical discoveries which, on a long enough 
time line, become common-sense beliefs in the pragmaticist sense (§4).13 James does 
                                                 
11 The name which Peirce gives to realism about continuity is ‘synechism’. James is quite clear that he 
holds this view, which he also attributes to Bergson. But Peirce disagreed on both James and Bergson's 
imprecise articulation of the theory (Letters from Peirce to James, 1909, quoted in Perry 1936, vol 2: 437-
440). See Dea (2015) and Haack (1977) for more on the metaphysical distinctions between James and 
Peirce. 
12 According to Peirce himself, this radical empiricist view would disqualify James from being an 
ontological nominalist. He tells us that ‘nominalists generally do not admit that there is any similarity 
in things apart from the mind; but they may admit that this exists, provided that they deny that it 
constitutes any unity among the things apart from the mind. They cannot admit the latter and remain 
consistent nominalists’ (1902, CP6.377).  
13 James does hold that we must adopt our belief in the uniformity of nature as a whole on seemingly a 
priori grounds, before we can begin to inquire into nature as discover these more ‘proximate’ laws (1890, 
PP 2: 1233-4). The belief in the uniformity of nature as a whole cannot be derived from experience, but 
rather serve as conditions for our inquiries into nature. As such, these beliefs must be adopted on the 
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not attribute the reality of such laws to the activity of human minds, but rather to the 
‘habitudes of concrete things’ (1890, PP1: 1233), or the ‘immutable habits which the 
different elementary sorts of matter follow’ (1890, PP1: 125). Like Peirce, then, James 
tends to attribute a principle of habit to matter as well as to organic beings, and is even 
occasionally tempted by a Peircean type cosmology in which these regularities grew 
over time from a period of relative chaos (1909, EPh: 369).14 Overall, James appears 
committed to the ontological reality of laws, continuity, and generality.  
 
§5.2. PERCEPTUAL NOMINALISM 
 
It is difficult to separate James’s metaphysical view from his work on perception and 
experience. This is because James thinks that experience is the ‘stuff’ of which reality 
is composed (1904, ERE: 4). This might cause problems for the realist reading of James, 
however, as he appears to hold a nominalist account of perception. The nominalist 
tends to think of immediate experience as a kind of ‘chaotic torrent of independent 
data’ which is subsequently categorised and organised by subjects on the basis of their 
personal interests. Nothing objective corresponds to the conceptual categorisations 
these subjects use to differentiate the originary experiential confusion, as they are 
merely the products of personal convenience. As such they cannot be ‘real’ in Peirce’s 
sense of being independent of personal opinion (Forster 2011: 4-5; cf. Peirce 1898 
CP4.1). 
It is easy to interpret James as this kind of nominalist when we remember his famous 
statement that experience in its immediacy is a ‘blooming, buzzing confusion’ (1890, 
PP1: 462), and his assertions that we tend to make order out of this chaos by reference 
to our interests, and a certain amount of ‘arbitrary choice’ (1907, P: 119). According to 
James the ‘cuts we make [in the ‘perceptual flux’] are purely ideal’ (1910, SPP: 32): 
the world we feel and live in, will be that which our ancestors and we, 
by slowly cumulative strokes of choice, have extricated out of this, as the 
sculptor extracts his statue by simply rejecting the other portions of the 
                                                 
basis of what Peirce would call ‘regulative’ or ‘intellectual’ hopes (cf. Peirce c.1890, CP1.405; c.1896, 
CP1.121; c.1901; CP7.187; CP7.219). For more on James’s account of the a priori, see Klein (2016). 
14 Cf. (Peirce 1898, CP6.209; CP6.262ff); (James 1904, ERE: 18; 1905, ERE: 74). 
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stone. Other sculptors, other statues from the same stone! Other minds, 
other worlds from the same chaos! (1879, EPs: 51-52). 
James's position seems to be that sensation or experience is at base chaotic, and that 
we make distinctions in this chaos according to our interests. 
However, the story is not that simple. James is careful to never suggest that the 
distinctions we draw within our perception refer to nothing real. In his Principles, 
James does not tell us that we make distinctions through interest, but that we detect 
them by using our interest (1890, PP1: 481). Real distinctions in our environment are 
either practically salient to us, and so interesting, or they are not. Practical interest 
makes us attend to certain elements of the environment, and ignore others (1890, PP1: 
487). Through practice and training, we can learn to attend to distinctions within the 
environment which are not of immediate practical interest to us, but which are 
nonetheless still objective distinctions (1890, PP1: 481). 
Making these conceptual distinctions is necessary for navigating the sensible flux of 
pure experience. Without being able to distinguish between features of experience on 
the basis of some purpose, we would be lost in a sea of sensation. Using concepts on 
this sensible flux allows us to perform all kinds of functions and operations on raw 
experience which prove to be useful. Just like our experience, the concepts which we 
use to organise it can themselves appear to be disordered and chaotic. However, in 
time, we come to see that there are inferential relations which connect these concepts, 
independent of our opinions about them, and so we begin to trace order in the 
conceptual realm also (1904, ERE: 9-10). James treats concepts and the inferential 
relations between them as a ‘co-ordinate realm’ of reality, just as real as percepts (1909, 
MT: 32). This is another sense in which James is committed to ontological realism 
about generals. 
What sense, then, should we make of James's assertion that the cuts we make in the 
sensible flux are ‘merely ideal’? In making this statement, James is contrasting the 
ideality of concepts with the real continuity of sensory experience. When they are not 
mistaken or misapplied, concepts respond to objective distinctions in our 
environment. But though concepts are useful, real, and track something objective, we 
should not think of concepts as definitively representing reality. Sensible reality is 
continuous, complex, and plural in a way that concepts are incapable of grasping. In 
Some Problems, James puts it this way: 
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The great difference between percepts and concepts is that percepts are 
continuous and concepts are discrete. Not discrete in their being, for 
conception as an act is part of the flux of feeling, but discrete from each 
other in their several meanings (1910, SPP: 32). 
Concepts are discrete from one another in a way that is not representative of sensible 
experience. Concepts can contradict each other, and we can trace their differences in 
a relatively exact fashion. In sensible reality, on the other hand, the ‘boundaries are no 
more distinct than are those of the field of vision [...] whatever we distinguish and 
isolate conceptually is found perceptually to telescope and compenetrate and diffuse 
into its neighbours’ (1910, SPP: 32). The cuts we make through conceptualisation, then, 
are ‘ideal’ in the sense that they make exact differences which are, in sensation, vague. 
James, then, does not seem committed to a nominalistic account of perception so much 
as he is committed to pluralistic account of experience. It is not the case that there are 
no objective discriminations to be made in our experience, or that our concepts refer 
to nothing real. It is in fact the opposite: there are too many such distinctions for all of 
them to be detected and attended to, and they are continuous and vague in ways that 
concepts can often miss.15 No conceptual system will be able to completely grasp the 
totality of our sensory reality, because some information escapes any attempt at 
conceptualisation. We shape the world of our lived experience by attending to some 
objective discriminations, and not to others. 
 
§5.3. EPISTEMOLOGICAL NOMINALISM 
 
The nominalist does not believe that concepts and propositions about general laws 
can be judged to be ‘true’ or ‘false’, but only ‘useful’ or ‘not useful’. Again, this is 
because there is nothing in reality which the propositions or concepts are true of. As 
Forster puts it: ‘for nominalists, laws and general concepts are artefacts of 
economizing minds to which nothing in reality literally corresponds’ (2011: 5). 
                                                 
15 Steven Levine makes the first point well in his recent article, where he says that ‘[w]hat is important 
to realize is that for James the sensory flux is a much-at-onceness that contains a plenitude or 
overabundance of qualities and relations’ (Levine 2013: 129). 
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James is routinely criticised for his conception of truth for just this reason. James seems 
to suggest that truth is what is ‘expedient’ or useful for us to believe (1907, P: 106). As 
it appears possible to separate truth and usefulness, given the prevalence of useful 
false beliefs, critics tend to see James as being led to a highly subjectivist position in 
which it is legitimate for us to believe anything we find useful, regardless of its truth. 
This is not the place to deal with such a vexed topic conclusively. Here I aim only to 
indicate that James was not a nominalist in this regard. 
James's treatment of truth emerges from his application of the pragmatic maxim. He 
is arguing against people who explain truth by appealing to a proposition's ‘self-
transcending’ capacity to refer to an object beyond itself. James finds such talk 
metaphysically confusing, and in need of pragmatic elucidation (1904, ERE: 27; 1909, 
MT: 61). Pragmatist analysis suggests that the practical effects of some belief being 
‘true’ would be that it allowed us to operate successfully in the world, and that we 
would encounter no problems if we continued to act according to it.  A proposition is 
true if it would lead us through a series of experiences to a verification of it (e.g. 1904, 
ERE: 14; 1907, ERE: 146-7). James does not deny that concepts and propositions need 
to agree with reality. He just elaborates what that relation means pragmatically. It 
means to be put in ‘working touch’ with reality (1907, P: 102). 
Taking a concept to be true pragmatically involves making a series of predictions 
about what kinds of experiences we will encounter. So, to test a concept's truth, we 
can see if it is an accurate predictor of future experience. If our predications are 
successful, and in practical cases that means useful, then we have good reason for 
suspecting that the concept is true. James clarifies his position in The Meaning of Truth, 
where he where he calls himself an ‘epistemological realist’ (1909, MT: 106), and 
argues that ‘the very condition of [concepts] having [...] utility’ is that ‘their objects 
should be really there’ (1909, MT: 112). So, though James is committed to the position 
that usefulness is a marker of truth, he is also committed to the position that what is 
most useful, at least in the long run, is for our ideas to agree with reality.  
There is a second way in which James might be considered an epistemological 
nominalist. Careless expression on James’s part can make it seem as if he holds that 
the truth of a concept is determined by the practical difference it makes within the 
experience of an individual. In Pragmatism, for instance, he states that the purpose of 
philosophy is to determine what ‘definite difference it will make to you and me […] if 
this world-formula or that world-formula be the true one’ (1907, P: 30). Peirce, in 
comparison, holds that truth is independent of the ‘vagaries’ of individual opinion, 
and emerges only within a community of inquiry, over time (1868, W2:239; cf. 1878, 
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W3:284-5). This individualistic move by the pragmatists who followed him greatly 
concerned Peirce (1908, CP6.485).16  
However, James’s considered view is closer to Peirce’s than it at first seems. James 
does aim to provide a meaningful place for individuals within philosophical inquiry. 
To this end, he allows individuals to generate novel hypotheses, challenge existing 
practices and institutions, and decide on personal grounds which hypothesis, out of a 
set of equally plausible and incompossible options, will be pursued (e.g. 1890, WB: 
190ff). But the verification of these hypotheses always depends on whether or not the 
wider environment of ‘outward relations’ confirms or denies them (1880, WB: 184-6). 
Though James admits that he sometimes writes, for ‘the sake of simplicity’, as if the 
experience of one individual were sufficient for the verification of a philosophical 
hypothesis, he insists that any question of significant scope requires ‘the experience of 
the entire human race’ and ‘the co-operation of generations’ to be verified (1882, WB: 
87-8). James maintains this position in his mature work, asserting that the pragmatist 
defines truth in terms of what is satisfactory, not to an individual, but in ‘the long run 
and on the whole’ (1909, MT: 9). Even in his most apparently subjectivist work, ‘The 
Will to Believe’, James holds that the verification of a belief is not found in any one 
individual’s experience, but in whether or not ‘the total drift of thinking continues to 
confirm it’ (1896, WB: 24). So, though James habitually talks about individual truth, he 
consistently separates what appears and functions as true for us, in our individual and 
fallible opinion, from what would be found to be true in the experience of human 
beings in the long run. The latter is what James calls ‘absolute truth’, meaning ‘what 
no farther experience will ever alter’ (1907, P: 106; cf. 1909, MT: 143).17 
The aim here is not to prove or disprove James's pragmatic account of truth. The aim 
is only to show that there are no large differences between Peirce and James on this 
matter. In the very same Monist paper in which Peirce sets up his division between 
pragmatism and pragmaticism, we find Peirce asserting that we must talk about truth 
and falsity in the practical terms of doubt and belief: 
                                                 
16 According to Misak, this opposition between truth ‘as a product of the individual’ and truth ‘as a 
product of the community over time’ is what is ‘at the heart of the dispute between James and Peirce’ 
(Misak, 2013: 60). 
17 There are still clear and interesting points of disagreement between James and Peirce in this area. The 
two thinkers obviously disagree on the nature and extent of individuals’ contribution to inquiry; on the 
kinds and breadth of experience which is considered relevant to philosophical inquiry (cf. Misak 2013: 
67-71); and on what counts as the right community for assessing philosophical beliefs (cf. Klein 2013).  
IS WILLIAM JAMES A PRAGMATICIST? 
21 
 
If your terms “truth” and “falsity” are taken in such senses as to be 
definable in terms of doubt and belief and the course of experience (as 
for example they would be, if you were to define the “truth” as that to a 
belief in which belief would tend if it were to tend indefinitely toward 
absolute fixity), well and good: in that case, you are only talking about 
doubt and belief […] Your problems would be greatly simplified, if, 
instead of saying that you want to know the “Truth,” you were simply 
to say that you want to attain a state of belief unassailable by doubt 
(Peirce, 1905, CP5.416). 
Peirce is denying the same transcendent accounts of truth that James is. Belief for the 
pragmatist is a habit of action, and real doubt is the interruption of that habit. If we 
have a belief that works, then we hold it to be true, at least for us, and at least for now. 
An absolutely true belief would be one which allowed us to act successfully and which 
would never encounter a real doubt. None of this is different from James's position. 
Perhaps the biggest difference in expression between the two positions is that whereas 
Peirce talks about a true belief as one which would be unassailable by doubt, James 
often talks about a true belief as one which will actually not encounter problems. This 
subtle difference has serious consequences. In fact, one element of scholastic realism 
hinges on the difference. 
In later works, Peirce bemoans what he calls his first ‘nominalistic’ expression of the 
pragmatic maxim. In ‘How to Make Our Ideas Clear’, Peirce presented the view that 
a diamond is hard if nothing actually will scratch it: 
[L]et us ask what we mean by calling a thing hard. Evidently that it will not be 
scratched by many other substances. The whole conception of this quality, as 
of every other, lies in its conceived effects. There is absolutely no difference 
between a hard thing and a soft thing so long as they are not brought to the test 
(Peirce 1878, W3:266). 
This position is nominalistic because it denies that there are general laws about 
diamonds which obtain even in the absence of actually being tested.  
The importance of the subjunctive over the indicative expression, then, is that it 
recognises that there are real generals and real possibilities, such that something would 
be the case if some event occurred, even if it actually does not. This is why Peirce later 
changes his view to say that any diamond which was destroyed before having been 
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brought to the test should still be considered hard, because it would have resisted 
scratching had it been tested (1905, CP7.453).  
James did not tend to express his pragmatism with this distinction in mind, and he 
often favourably quoted Peirce's first ‘nominalistic’ expression of the pragmatic 
maxim. This might lead us to suspect that James continued to hold the original, 
indicative interpretation of it. However, there are plenty of instances in which James 
confirms that it is the second, subjunctive expression he would agree to. For instance, 
in expressing three different kinds of cognitive relation which can obtain between 
knower and known object, James suggests that one is that ‘the known object is a 
possible experience either of that subject or another, to which the said conjunctive 
transitions would lead, if sufficiently prolonged’ (1904, ERE: 27). In a reported 
interview of 1908, James explicitly tells his audience that ‘truth is constituted by [some 
proposition’s] verifiability, not by the act of verification’ (1908, ML: 442). Seeing as 
James is a realist about cognitive relations of this kind, he is also a realist about 
possibility in the way Peirce's realism requires.18 
Overall, then, James appears to have rejected ontological, perceptual, and 
epistemological nominalism. He has shown himself to be a realist about generals, 
about continuity, about laws, and about relations. Therefore, I think we can conclude 
that James meets the sixth and final criterion Peirce sets out to be recognised as a 
‘pragmaticist’. 
§6. CONCLUSION 
 
In the Monist papers of 1905, Peirce presents a detailed account of a more precise 
version of pragmatism he called ‘pragmaticism’. It was his aim in doing this to 
separate himself from other pragmatists, such as William James, whose expressions of 
pragmatism he found too broad or misapplied. This set the stage for scholars in years 
to come to separate Peircean and Jamesian pragmatisms, often on the grounds Peirce 
himself set out. In this paper I have argued that, in actual fact, James meets the six 
criteria Peirce set out in defining pragmaticism: James holds a version of the pragmatic 
                                                 
18 James frequently expressed realism about possibility, chance, and novelty, usually against the 
determinist or the intellectual monist (1884, WB: 114ff; 1910, SPP: 76ff). He connected this realism with 
his theory of pluralism (1896, WB: 6; 1907, P: 78; 1910, SPP: 72-75), as well as with Peirce’s theory of 
‘tychism’ (cf. 1902-3, ML: 268ff; 1909, PU: 153). 
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maxim (criterion 1); he meets the ‘preliminary propositions’ of anti-foundationalism, 
anti-scepticism, and holding that beliefs are habits of action (criterion 2); he applies 
the scientific method to philosophy (criterion 3); but nonetheless thinks subjects such 
as metaphysics and logic can be studied (criterion 4); he is a common-sensist of a 
critical sort (criterion 5); and most importantly he is a realist about generals (criterion 
6). We should, I conclude, be willing to call James a ‘pragmaticist’ alongside Peirce. 
Some of James’s more careful critics recognise that he does, at times, express Peircean 
sounding theses, but question their consistency in his work. Misak, for instance, 
recognises that when ‘at his best’ James expresses a very Peircean sounding account 
of truth, despite his sometimes ‘infelicitous wording’ and a popular style which 
‘blur[s] the subtleties’ of the pragmatist position. However, according to Misak, 
James’s work also contains a thread of subjectivism which exists in tension with his 
more sensible pragmatism (Misak, 2013: 53-60). No-one can deny that James’s writing 
style often encourages misinterpretation. Nonetheless, in this paper I have argued that 
from his earliest work until his latest, James was keen to express a kind of pragmatism 
which was in line with Peirce’s more technically defined pragmaticism. It is my 
contention that most, if not all, of James’s more subjectivist sounding statements can 
and should be interpreted in line with this pragmaticism.19  
That said, the aim of this paper has not been to eradicate all of the differences between 
these thinkers. Their common pragmaticism aside, we would be hard-pressed to find 
two figures with more dissimilar philosophical temperaments. Whereas Peirce – 
focused on rejecting nominalism – prioritised the general in his pragmaticism, James 
– focused on rejecting monistic idealism – prioritised the individual in his, sometimes 
at the expense of sounding subjectivistic.  The two disagree about the types of 
experience that ought to be considered appropriate in philosophical inquiry, the 
nature of the relevant community of inquiry, and the extremity of their ‘scholastic’ 
realism. But these disagreements are interesting precisely because they are 
disagreements within the same philosophical approach. To see them as denoting a 
difference in kinds of pragmatism tends to block the road of inquiry, as it allows us to 
dismiss potentially productive disagreements as being irrelevant to whichever kind 
we prefer. Uniting James and Peirce on the grounds of pragmaticism means that their 
disagreements regain a sense of vitality and interest, and allows for new comparisons, 
                                                 
19 Of course, fully defending this position is outside the scope of this paper.  
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challenges, and inquiries which will be relevant to both classical and contemporary 
pragmatism.20 
 
                                                 
20 Acknowledgements removed for blind review. 
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